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Introduction 
In this chapter we briefly recount some of the historical motivating factors in the 
field of sentence processing that led it to explore the integration of visual context and 
language processing (especially with the Visual World Paradigm).  We discuss some of 
the strengths and weaknesses of this experimental methodology and the implications for 
theories of sentence processing.  We conclude that the majority of contemporary findings 
in sentence processing point to a richly interactive cognitive processing system in which 
structural constraints and content-based constraints have roughly equal timing and 
importance in their influence on real-time sentence comprehension.  In this emerging 
theoretical framework, it is expected that any given linguistic process of interest will be 
best understood when analyzed not in isolation but when embedded in the context in 
which it is typically situated. 
The past several decades of research in sentence processing have seen the 
pendulum swing between extremes in theoretical frameworks.  Around the 1960s, 
language and communication research was driven chiefly by syntactic structure 
(Chomsky, 1965), and an assumption that the purpose of language is to produce an 
internal representation of a transmitted message.  Herb Clark (1992) later dubbed this 
long-standing tradition the “language-as-product” approach. This framework was 
supported with laboratory tests on theories of transformational grammar (Miller, 1962) 
and clausal processing (Bever, Lackner, & Kirk, 1969).  Around the 1970s, a resurgence 
of a psychological framework called the “New Look” (Erdelyi, 1974) helped renew an 
emphasis on semantics (Lakoff, 1971), pragmatics (Clark & Haviland, 1977), and their 
fluid interaction with syntax (Marslen-Wilson, 1975).  This framework treats language 
not as a message-transmission device but instead as a richly interactive enterprise that is 
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part and parcel of coordinated action among multiple people. Clark (1992) dubbed this 
alternative tradition the “language-as-action” approach (see also Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 
2005).   
By the 1980s, the field of sentence processing returned its emphasis to structure, 
with syntactic parsing as the autonomous front-end processor in a staged-based modular 
account of sentence processing (Frazier & Rayner, 1982; Ferreira & Clifton, 1986).  In 
the 1990s, parallel interactive constraint-based approaches rose to prominence once 
again, with new experimental evidence (Altmann, Garnham, & Dennis, 1992; 
MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995).   
Coincident with those theoretical oscillations over those decades, there tended to 
be oscillations between the predominant experimental methods being used.  With some 
exceptions, the studies supporting modular stage-based accounts of sentence processing 
generally used pared-down contexts and the earliest on-line measures available (e.g., eye-
movement measures while reading isolated sentences on a computer screen in the dark).  
By contrast, the studies supporting interactive dynamic accounts of sentence processing 
tended to use rich realistic contexts and tasks and relatively off-line measures of 
processing (e.g., analyses of natural conversation transcripts during cooperative tasks).  
Consequently, there was a common assumption by the early 1990s: if an experiment 
showed processing interactions between structure and content, then the temporal 
precision of its experimental methods was probably just too coarse to detect that brief 
early processing stage during which syntactic processing took place autonomously and in 
a context-free manner. 
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 All this changed when headband-mounted eyetracking during spoken language 
comprehension became one of the new prominent experimental methods in the field of 
sentence processing (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; for an 
underappreciated predecessor, see Cooper, 1974).  In this paradigm, participants have 
their eye movements recorded while they look at visual objects on a table or on a 
computer screen, and listen to spoken instructions or stories about those objects (for a 
detailed methodological introduction, see Pykkönnen & Crocker, this volume).  For better 
or worse, this new method eventually became known as the Visual World Paradigm, an 
approach that permeates this volume.  Methodologically speaking, the Visual World 
Paradigm allows the best of both worlds, in that these two seemingly mutually-exclusive 
experimental design features were finally combined:  
1) rich realistic contexts and tasks    
2) the real-time recording of eye movements in response to linguistic input  
 
What does Context Mean? 
 Every psycholinguist acknowledges that context is important, but some theoretical 
positions reserve the influence of context to a late-stage module that merely revises or 
corrects the output of an autonomous early-stage module (e.g., Rayner, Carlson, & 
Frazier, 1983; Staub, 2011; Swinney, 1979).  In this type of account, just about anything 
could be the early-stage “process-in-question,” and just about anything else could be the 
“context.”  For example, the process-in-question could be syntactic parsing and the 
context could be pragmatic discourse constraints (Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Ferreira 
& Clifton, 1986). Or the process-in-question could be word recognition and the context 
could be syntactic structure (Goodman, McClelland, & Gibbs, 1981; Tanenhaus, Leiman 
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& Seidenberg, 1979).  The curious thing that happened in the field of sentence 
processing, in particular, is that the prevailing emphasis on the importance of syntactic 
structure had the effect of allowing many researchers to slip into the implicit assumption 
that syntactic parsing was, by default, the “process-in-question,” and everything else was 
“context.” 
 In actuality, the process-in-question can be anything one wishes to manipulate and 
test experimentally, be this syntax, semantics, pragmatics or phonetics.  Context will 
always be relative to this main variable, and what we contend here is that there is 
absolutely nothing that cannot be context.  In doing so, two implications emerge: there is 
a continuum of context strength ranging from very unrelated to very related, and that in 
principle anything can become context.  The former could be tested by seeing if people 
are sensitive to degrees of relationship strength, and the latter can be thought of both 
intuitively, and investigated experimentally. 
 Intuitively, imagine we take two very unrelated words that one would never 
expect to hear together, such as “potato” and “sky”.  A potato is traditionally not thought 
of as related to the sky.  But if every time my coauthor and I meet we say “The potato is 
in the sky”, then after a period of time we will begin to use “sky” as context for “potato”.  
One may think of “refrigerator” as a better context for a potato, but it is better because 
we have experience with potatoes being in this location.  Perhaps the best context for a 
potato is “ground” because it is common knowledge that this is where potatoes grow and 
spend most of their time.  Again, this is the best context because of the extent of our 
experience with seeing potatoes in this location, or simply by others using this as a 
context most often linguistically. 
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 To rephrase this definition of context theoretically, it naturally stems from a 
statistical learning account where percepts and features are defined by the strength of 
their connections, and those connections emerge as a result of the embodied and situated 
character of natural language use (Louwerse, 2008).  These connections are developed as 
a result of co-occurrence: two things in close proximity in either space or time.  Thus, 
two words in the same sentence, or two objects sitting near one another on a table, could 
constitute some of this learning, by ear and by eye respectively.  If certain discourse 
devices exhibit co-occurrences with certain syntactic structures (e.g., Crain & Steedman, 
1985), then this too will be learned.  Many seemingly high-level inferences can be the 
result of spatiotemporal proximity, for example children attributing the cause of an event 
based on order, rather than another causal cue (Bullock & Gelman, 1979).  Proximity and 
probability are the core principles of this account, though their exact role in a learning 
mechanism still remains much debated (Levy, 2011; see also Jones & Love, 2011). 
 Thus, in a fully interactive dynamic process of language comprehension, no one 
information source can be the “process-in-question.”  Rather, every information source 
that is relevant (or correlated with behavioral outcomes) is combined as soon as it is 
available.  Syntax, semantics, phonological correlations, lexical frequency effects, 
discourse information, and visual/situational information are all contextual constraints for 
each other. Context is relative. 
 
What does a Real-Time Measure Mean? 
 Experimentally, those intuitions about context can be applied in the following 
manner.  If it is indeed the case that various information sources can perform as context 
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for each other, then our experimental designs should try to steer toward ecologically valid 
tasks that situate the language user in a realistic environment where many of those 
potential contexts are present (and systematically controlled as much as possible).  If our 
tasks were to continue to focus on one “process-in-question” and one contextual 
manipulation, while brutishly eliminating all other contextual variables from the stimulus 
environment, then our research field would risk producing results that do not generalize 
to natural situations.  Importantly, there is nothing that in principle makes these richly 
contextualized circumstances mutually exclusive with continuous real-time measures of 
cognitive processing.  It is merely a historical accident that the two have tended not to 
converge. 
 The Visual World Paradigm exploits natural eye movements to provide a 
continuous real-time measure of what objects/locations in the visual environment are 
attracting attention moment-by-moment as a result of the participant processing linguistic 
input in a variety of situational contexts.  A great deal of research in visual cognition and 
cognitive neuroscience has convincingly shown that, under unrestricted viewing 
conditions, where the eyes move is a very useful index of where attention is being 
directed (Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995).  This is largely due to the fact that eye 
movements and visual attention have many brain areas in common (Corbetta, 1998). 
 Since eye movements are so tightly interwoven with cognitive processes, and they 
happen 3-4 times per second, recording them thus provides a rich semi-continuous 
measure of language and cognition.  With this eyetracking methodology, one sees first-
hand the fluidity with which eye movements respond to the continuous stream of spoken 
linguistic input, and how those eye movements then change what parts of the visual 
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context project onto the foveas, and how that newly foveated object changes the way the 
next phoneme is processed. This perception-action loop (a la Neisser, 1976) has such a 
continuous-in-time circular flow that the causal chain (of whether a foveated visual 
stimulus caused a cognitive process to begin or whether a cognitive process caused a 
visual stimulus to be foveated) becomes impossible to unravel into a simple linear 
sequence.   
 In this way, use of this methodological tool has profound consequences for theory 
development in psycholinguistics.  It is actually quite common for new scientific tools to 
inspire new perspectives on old theories – such as when electrophysiological 
measurements by DuBois-Reymond and Helmholtz supplanted the comparative 
physiology techniques used in the 19th century, and thus dramatically shifted the study of 
physiology from being a qualitative science to becoming a quantitative science (Lenoir, 
1986; see also Gigerenzer, 1992). Scientific tools and scientific theories are not as 
independent of one another as they are often treated.  By collecting multiple 
measurements within the time span of a single experimental trial, instead of the 
traditional one-measurement-per-trial, the dense-sampling measurement of eye 
movements allows the experimenter to obtain a glimpse at the ongoing temporal 
dynamics of a single cognitive process – not just its end result.  In the case of the 
perception-action loop of eye movements, what we observe is a recurrent causal loop of 
ongoing cognitive processes instigating eye movements that then substantially alter the 
trajectory of those same cognitive processes every few hundred milliseconds.  Thus, each 
cognitive event is simultaneously caused by the sensory results of the previous eye 
movement, and causes the direction of the next eye movement, and then may itself be 
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   9	  
altered mid-process due to the sensory result of that new eye movement. The new 
perspective on the old theory, in this case, is one in which dynamical systems theory, 
emergence and self-organization (Beer, 2000, Elman, 2004; Spivey, 2007; Van Orden, 
Holden, & Turvey, 2003) may figure prominently in the explanation of language 
processes in a visual context. 
 It is not necessary for one’s own metatheoretical stance to drift toward dynamical 
systems theory, emergence and self-organization, as a result of exploring the Visual 
World Paradigm.  However, when sifting through the data from this methodology, it is 
inevitable that the range of theoretical alternatives one considers will expand.  The 
temporal fluidity with which different information sources seem to interact, as evidenced 
by the eye movement patterns, can at times be difficult to reconcile with traditional non-
cascading stage-based models of real-time processing.  The adaptation of headband-
mounted eyetracking methods from visual cognition experiments (Ballard, Hayhoe & 
Pelz, 1995) into psycholinguistic experiments (Tanenhaus et al., 1995) opened up the 
floodgates for a wide range of experimental designs that altered the theoretical landscape 
not just in sentence processing (Chambers, this volume; Knoeferle, this volume), but also 
in referential processing (Engelhardt & Ferreira, this volume; van Gompel & Järvikivi, 
this volume), discourse comprehension (Kaiser, this volume), figurative language 
processing (Huette & Matlock, this volume), perspective-taking (Barr, this volume), and 
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Syntactic Ambiguity Resolution in the Visual World Paradigm 
 A number of important insights have been obtained from the application of 
eyetracking (and other dense-sampling measures of motor movement, such as postural 
sway and computer-mouse tacking) to spoken language processing in a constraining 
visual context.  One of the most important of these insights is that language 
comprehension is not simply incremental (such that words are processed upon arrival, 
rather than waiting for a phrase to be delivered before parsing it), but is genuinely 
continuous in time.  To truly be “incremental,” the process would need to have 
identifiable increments in time.  However, every time we look at a potential increment 
(whether it be a sentence, a word, or a phoneme) we find temporal fluctuations within the 
processing of that putative increment – suggesting that the increment has sub-increments 
within it that are interacting with other information sources.  Just as physics came to grips 
with the fact that no atom is indivisible, psycholinguistics is gradually coming to grips 
with the fact that no linguistic unit is indivisible. 
 Another important insight from the Visual World Paradigm is that the continuous 
cascade of processing appears to go not just in feedforward but also in feedback and 
through lateral connections.  In the following sections, we recount this wide variety of 
contextual sensitivities that are observed at many levels of language processing. This 
richly interactive dynamic account of language encourages the field to do more than 
merely take the old fashioned box-and-arrow diagram of language processing and add 
new arrows connecting previously unconnected boxes.  A dynamical systems framework 
of language encourages the field to move away entirely from the box-and-arrow 
metaphor and instead adopt an approach that combines all information sources into one 
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high-dimensional state space where the interaction between different formats of 
information is constrained in a graded statistical fashion (Elman, 2004; Gaskell & 
Marslen-Wilson, 2002; Onnis & Spivey, 2012), but never summarily prohibited by the 
architecture of the system (as argued in Forster, 1979, and Staub, 2011). 
 An important real-time measure of this fluid and immediate interaction between 
syntactic information and situational context information came from work by Tanenhaus 
et al. (1995), in their development of the Visual World Paradigm.  They placed real three-
dimensional objects on a table in front of the participant (who wore a headband-mounted 
eyetracker) and recorded their eye movements while they carried out instructions that 
were spoken live into a microphone, such as “Put the apple that’s on the towel in the 
box.”  That unambiguous control sentence was juxtaposed with a syntactically ambiguous 
version, “Put the apple on the towel in the box,” which can be expected to cause listeners 
to briefly consider treating “on the towel” as the destination of the put event.  When the 
table had only one apple on it (resting on a towel), participants frequently looked at a 
second irrelevant towel, as though they were briefly considering placing the apple on that 
other towel.  This eye movement was thus indicative of a syntactic garden-path effect in 
that visual context: halfway through the sentence, people temporarily considered a 
structural parse that involved attaching “on the towel” to the verb.  By contrast, when the 
same instruction was delivered in a context that had two apples (one already on a towel 
and the other not), that garden-path eye movement no longer happened.  Essentially, the 
presence of an extra apple (which was not resting on a towel) introduced a referential 
ambiguity for the noun phrase “the apple,” such that the prepositional phrase “on the 
towel” had to be syntactically attached to the noun phrase to disambiguate the reference 
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(see also Altmann & Steedman, 1988).  Thus, the syntactic garden-path was prevented by 
the visual/situational context. 
 One concern with those results was that the garden-path may have been avoided 
not by syntax consulting visual context information but by the simple fact that, in the 
two-referent context, the eyes were busy vacillating between the two apples while the 
disambiguating information in the sentence was eventually delivered.  What was needed 
was a visual context in which “the apple” was not quite referentially ambiguous, but still 
readily accommodated parsing “on the towel” as a modifier for that noun phrase – instead 
of being attached to the verb to denote the destination of the action.   To deal with this 
concern, Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, and Sedivy (2002) designed a “3-and-1-referent” 
context, in which the extra apple was replaced by a trio of indistinguishable apples.  In 
this context, “the apple” clearly refers to the lone apple resting on a towel because the 
determiner “the” presupposes uniqueness of that referent (Heim, 1982; Spivey-Knowlton 
& Sedivy, 1995).  As a result, participants almost never looked at the trio of apples when 
they heard “Put the apple…”  And yet, the naturalness of “on the towel” being a noun-
phrase modifier in that visual context still allowed them to avoid the syntactic garden-
path. 
 Another concern even with those results is the fact that on any one particular trial, 
the data show the subject either looking at the garden-path object or not.  This 
complicates the parsing account that one can formulate.  It could be that two syntactic 
parses are being simultaneously considered after the ambiguity is encountered, and 
context is able to quickly bias the competition process between those two parses (e.g., 
MacDonald et al., 1994; Spivey, Anderson, & Farmer, 2013).  Alternatively, instead of a 
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competition process, it could be that only one parse is ever held in working memory at 
any one time, and context can immediately participate in determining which single parse 
is pursued (Van Gompel, Pickering, Pearson, & Liversedge, 2005; Van Gompel, 
Pickering, & Traxler, 2001).  In the former scenario, individual experimental trials should 
comprise a continuous distribution with gradations between mild and strong magnitudes 
of garden-path effects.  In the latter scenario, individual trials should either involve a 
garden-path effect or not, and thus should comprise a bimodal distribution.  Since the 
eye-movement data cannot help but produce a binomial distribution in which each event 
either did or did not involve a fixation of the garden-path object, it is difficult to use those 
data to distinguish between these two theoretical alternatives. 
 An adaptation of the Visual World Paradigm that allows for the production of a 
normal distribution in which each event can show a gradation of garden-path magnitude 
(if such exists) is computer-mouse tracking.  In computer-mouse tracking, the streaming 
x,y coordinates of mouse position over time are recorded while participants select and/or 
move objects on the computer screen.  Partial consideration of one object followed by 
final selection of a different object is often realized as a curved mouse trajectory that 
initially moves somewhat toward the partially considered object and then directly toward 
the selected object.  The magnitude of that curvature toward the competitor object can be 
treated as a graded indicator of how strongly that unchosen alternative was considered 
(Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005).  In the case of syntactic ambiguity resolution, this 
allowed Farmer, Anderson, and Spivey (2007) to record continuous mouse trajectories 
when people were instructed to, “Put the apple on the towel in the box,” and measure 
how much the movement of the apple curved toward the irrelevant towel on its way to the 
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box.  Not only did they find that changes in visual context could make the syntactic 
garden-path come and go (just as in the eye-movement data), but they also found that the 
magnitude of that garden-path curvature was able to clear up the question of whether: a) 
individual trials involve a binomial option of either garden-pathing or not (Van Gompel 
et al., 2001, 2005), or b) parallel competition among two active syntactic parses can 
produce graded degrees of garden-path magnitude (MacDonald et al., 1994; Spivey et al., 
2013).   While the former predicts a bimodal distribution of substantially curved mouse 
trajectories and straight ones, the latter predicts a unimodal distribution of moderately 
curved trajectories.  Consistent with a parallel competition account of syntactic ambiguity 
resolution, Farmer et al. found a clearly unimodal distribution that was generally normal 
(though somewhat leptokurtotic).  For more in-depth discussion of computer-mouse 
tracking, see Farmer, Anderson, Freeman, and Dale (this volume). 
 It is worth noting that these results of visual context influencing the competition 
between two mutually exclusive syntactic parses of a sentence should not be interpreted 
as indicating that it is simply the objects themselves in the visual context that can exert 
that influence.  In certain circumstances, it would be more appropriate to think of it as the 
actions that are afforded by those objects that are exerting the influence on syntactic 
ambiguity resolution (see Chambers, this volume).  For example, Chambers, Tanenhaus, 
and Magnuson (2004) gave participants instructions like, “Pour the egg in the bowl on 
the flour.” and then manipulated the affordances of those eggs.  When participants were 
viewing a real 3-D table with two liquid eggs (extracted from their shells, one in a glass 
and one in a bowl), along with an irrelevant empty bowl and a pile of flour on wax paper, 
their eye-movement patterns indicated that they were parsing the syntactically ambiguous 
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prepositional phrase “in the bowl” as a noun-phrase modifier, and thus avoided the 
garden-path effect in that visual context.  Essentially, both eggs were potential references 
of “Pour the egg” because they were both pourable.  In contrast, when the visual context 
was subtly changed, such that there were still two eggs but the one in the glass was still in 
its shell and thus not pourable, all of a sudden the garden-path effect came back!  Simply 
having two referents for “the egg” is not enough to introduce the referential uncertainty 
that leads to avoidance of the garden-path.  There needs to be referential uncertainty for 
the entire phrase “Pour the egg,” so they both need to be pourable.  Thus, the constraints 
being imposed on the syntactic ambiguity resolution process are not simply visual objects 
that may or may not be referred to, but rather a more complex notion of the entire 
situation (and the possible actions that it affords) in which the utterance is being delivered 
(Barsalou, 1999). 
 Of course, it would be naïve to think that somehow situational context was the 
only information source that influenced syntactic parsing.  Even in the circumstance of an 
immersive visual/situational context that constrains the range of actions that could be 
carried out, more purely linguistic information sources are also playing a role in resolving 
syntactic ambiguity.  In self-paced reading and eye-tracking reading experiments, 
Trueswell, Tanenhaus, and Kello (1993) already showed compelling evidence for verb-
specific biases (in terms of statistical preferences for certain argument structures) having 
an immediate influence on the resolution of syntactic ambiguity.  During reading, these 
verb-specific preferences can create or prevent a garden-path effect depending on what 
direction they bias the parsing process.   
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 Snedeker and Trueswell (2004) used the Visual World Paradigm to show that 
these verb-specific biases can still influence processing even in constraining 
visual/situational contexts.  For example, the verb “choose” does not have a strong 
statistical preference for an Instrument with-phrase, as in “Choose a donut with the 
tongs.”  It is much more common for a with-phrase after “choose” to be a modifier for the 
noun-phrase as in, “Choose a donut with pink frosting and sprinkles.”  By contrast, the 
verb “tickle” is quite frequently followed by an Instrument with-phrase, as in “Tickle the 
baby with the feather.”  Verb-specific biases like this become quite relevant when 
someone is instructed to “Choose the cow with the stick,” or “Tickle the cow with the 
stick,” in a visual context that has a stick, and two toy cows (one of which is holding a 
stick).   Clearly, there is a wide variety of information sources that influence syntactic 
ambiguity resolution, including lexical biases (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004), semantic 
biases (Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Garnsey, 1994), discourse context (Altmann & 
Steedman, 1988), and visual/situational context (Tanenhaus et al., 1995), among others.  
Moreover, it looks as though these information sources combine as soon as they are 
available and their integration may involve a competition process that gradually settles 
somewhat toward one or another of the syntactic alternatives (MacDonald et al., 1994; 
McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Spivey & Tanenhaus, 1998).  
Importantly, it may very well be that the various information sources that immediately 
influence parsing do so with different relative weights depending on the mode of 
language processing, such as reading versus instruction-following in a visual context 
versus unconstrained two-way conversation (see discussion in Spivey et al., 2002). 
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Semantic Comprehension in the Visual World Paradigm 
 Syntactic parsing is certainly not the only linguistic process that will reveal its 
underpinnings when tested in the Visual World Paradigm.  Just like the structure, the 
content of a spoken sentence shows itself to be incrementally understood and sensitive to 
contextual biases as the speech unfolds over time.  In fact, it is sometimes even faster 
than incremental: it is anticipatory. Altmann and Kamide (1999) presented participants 
with line drawings of scenes containing a potential agent (e.g., a boy) and several 
possible direct objects (only one of which was edible, e.g., a cake).  When participants 
heard “The boy will move the cake,” they pretty quickly moved their eyes from the boy 
to the cake.  However, when they heard “The boy will eat the cake,” many of them were 
already fixating the cake before the word “cake” was uttered!  Thus, the verb’s thematic 
role preferences (e.g., direct objects that are edible) were immediately combined with the 
situational context to make the full sentence understood before it was even finished being 
spoken (see also Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003, and Kamide, in this volume).  
One may then ask what happens when the situational context and the verb’s preferred 
thematic role properties don’t quite match up?  What if your thematic role knowledge of 
verbs tells you that spying is typically performed by detectives and hexing is typically 
performed by wizards, but the visual scene shows you a detective holding a magic wand 
and a wizard using a pair of binoculars?  Knoeferle and Crocker (2006) showed that, in 
situations like that, participants make anticipatory eye movements that are consistent with 
using the visual context as the guide for likely agents of spying events and hexing events.  
Similar to that observed in the syntactic ambiguity resolution literature, it looks as though 
verb-based preferences are indeed still active during spoken language comprehension in 
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the Visual World Paradigm, but when the visual context conflicts with them, the co-
present situational information tends to outweigh the stored lexical biases (see also 
Knoeferle’s chapter in this volume). 
 It is worth noting that it is not only references to Subjects and Objects of a verb 
that can direct participants’ attention in the Visual World Paradigm.  The verb itself can 
direct attention, even when its implication of motion is subtle and metaphorical.  Take, 
for example, the sentence, “The road goes through the desert.”  The road itself doesn’t 
actually go anywhere.  It is made of asphalt that stays right where it was laid.  However, 
cognitive linguistic analyses have suggested that there is a kind of imaginary form of 
motion, i.e., fictive motion, which is generated by the use of such action verbs in non-
action descriptions.  Richardson and Matlock (2007) used the Visual World Paradigm to 
show that people’s eye movements actually provide a hint into that perceptually 
simulated visual motion during comprehension of fictive motion sentences. When the 
context sentence described the road as rocky and difficult to traverse, participants spent 
more time passing their eyes over the road region of the display than when the context 
sentence described the road as smooth and easy.  It was as though listeners were mentally 
simulating movement on the road, and went slower when the road was difficult.  Control 
sentences that did not contain fictive motion, such as “The road is in the desert,” showed 
no such effect of the context sentence (see also Huette and Matlock, this volume). 
 Not only can the eyes be guided by a perceptual simulation of visual information 
(such as motion), that isn’t actually present in the static visual display, but they can also 
be guided by a visual memory of information – after the display has become entirely 
blank.  For example, Altmann (2004) replicated some of the anticipatory eye-movement 
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results from Altmann and Kamide (1999) with a display that initially presented the 
potential Subjects and Direct Objects and then took them away.  With the screen totally 
blank, participants still made eye movements to the corresponding locations of the 
appropriate entities (which were now empty) while the spoken sentence was being 
understood.  Knoeferle and Crocker (2007) then followed suit, showing that the 
demonstrated preference for depicted-event biases over thematic-role biases (Knoeferle 
& Crocker 2006) wanes over time after the scene has been removed, such that thematic-
role biases drive processing more and more as the visual memory decays.  (See also 
Chambers & San Juan, 2008, for evidence of the integration of immediately-perceptible 
constraints and more abstract thematic/conceptual constraints in real-time reference 
resolution).  In fact, the Visual World Paradigm can even be informative when there was 
never any visual input provided in the first place!  Rather than visual memory of a 
recently viewed scene, a perceptual simulation generated solely by the spoken sentence 
can guide the eyes to move in ways that correspond to the relative locations of entities 
and events in a story.  Spivey and Geng (2001) delivered spoken vignettes to participants 
while they faced a large blank projection screen, and observed that stories about upward-
moving events elicited a preponderance of upward saccades, and stories about 
downward-moving events elicited a preponderance of downward saccades.  Even more 
subtle differences in the spoken input, such as grammatical aspect, can influence the eye 
movement pattern while participants are viewing a blank screen.  Huette, Winter, 
Matlock, Ardell, and Spivey (2014) compared a series of sentences delivered in the past 
progressive form, such as “John was delivering a pizza” (which uses imperfective aspect 
to emphasize the ongoing nature of the event) and a series of sentences delivered in the 
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simple past form, such as “John delivered a pizza” (which uses perfective aspect to 
emphasize the completed end-state of the event).  With the imperfective grammatical 
aspect, they found a wider dispersion of eye movements over the span of the blank 
display, and significantly shorter fixation durations, suggesting that the grammatical 
emphasis on ongoing action elicits eye movement patterns that are consistent with a 
perceptual simulation of visual motion – even while viewing a completely blank screen. 
 
Spoken Word Recognition 
 At a finer time scale, of words instead of sentences, the Visual World Paradigm 
has provided some of its most well known discoveries in the real-time dynamics of 
spoken word recognition.  Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, and Tanenhaus (1995) 
reported delayed mean saccade latencies to a named object (such as “candle”) when a real 
3-D object with a similar name was also visually present (such as a candy), as well as 
frequent eye movements to that object with the similar name (Spivey-Knowlton, 1996).  
Allopenna, Magnuson, and Tanenhaus (1998) used a computer display to extend those 
findings to include not just cohorts (such as looking briefly at a candy when instructed to 
“Click the candle”) but also rhymes (such as looking briefly at a handle when instructed 
to “Click the candle”).   Moreover, they mapped out a computational implementation of 
how the time course of activations of lexical representations in the brain might be 
mapped onto the time course of proportions of fixations on objects with those names.  
Using the TRACE neural network model of speech perception (McClelland & Elman, 
1986), they fit the activation curves of lexical nodes onto the proportion-of-fixation 
curves in the eye-movement data.  Thus, a linking hypothesis was computationally 
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fleshed out between putative activations of lexical representations and the observed 
behavior.   
 Due to priming studies, it had been generally accepted that multiple lexical 
representations become active in parallel during the recognition of a spoken word 
(Marslen-Wilson, 1987; Marslen-Wilson & Zwitserlood, 1989).  However, seeing the 
eyes spontaneously move toward objects that have names that should be partially active 
was a compelling demonstration of this prediction (which stems from most theories of 
spoken word recognition).  Nonetheless, these eye-movement results were initially met 
with some degree of skepticism on the grounds that the task and display might be 
unnatural and prone to strategic influences.  For example, the apparent parallel activation 
of multiple lexical items during spoken word recognition in this paradigm could, in 
principle, be the result of a working memory buffer containing the names of the objects in 
the display (e.g., candy, candle, penny, spoon, etc.)  It could be that -- in these less than 
ecologically valid circumstances involving computer-delivered instructions to move 
random objects -- acoustic-phonetic input is mapped onto that temporarily-constructed 
working memory buffer rather than onto the lexicon.  If there were a cognitive module 
called the lexicon that was required for normal everyday spoken word recognition, and 
the task in those experiments didn’t even use that module, then the results would indeed 
have little application to normal everyday spoken word recognition.  
 Notably, there are numerous findings that make it hard for that “working memory 
buffer” account to hold water.  For starters, lexical frequency effects show up in the eye 
movement data (Dahan, Magnuson & Tanenhaus, 2001; Magnuson, Tanenhaus, Aslin & 
Dahan, 2003).  Competitor objects with higher frequency names are more likely to attract 
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eye movements than competitor objects with lower frequency names. That shouldn’t 
happen if the acoustic-phonetic input were purely being mapped onto a temporary buffer.  
Also, interlingual cohort effects show that bilinguals listening to one of their languages 
will often produce eye movements to objects whose names are phonetically similar in the 
other language (Ju & Luce, 2004; Marian & Spivey, 2003; Spivey & Marian, 1999; 
Weber & Cutler, 2004).  For example, Russian-English bilinguals will often look at a 
stamp when instructed to “Pick up the marker,” because in Russian the stamp is known as 
marka.  It is perhaps unlikely that bilinguals construct a temporary buffer in both of their 
languages for all the objects that are in front of them. 
 The finding that partial phonological similarity in an object’s name can attract an 
eye movement during the real-time comprehension of a spoken word has been extended 
in a number of ways.  Dahan, Swingley, Tanenhaus, and Magnuson (2000) showed that, 
in French, a gendered determiner that preceded the temporarily ambiguous spoken word 
(e.g., les boutons) could prevent eye movements to the object with a similar-sounding 
name (e.g, bouteilles) simply because it has the wrong gender marking.  Thus, the 
activation of lexical representations during incremental processing of a word’s unfolding 
acoustic-phonetic input is constrained by the context of the determiner delivered only a 
couple hundred milliseconds beforehand.  And it is more than phonological similarity 
that pulls attention and eye movements to competitor objects in the display.  Semantic 
similarity works as well.  When instructed to “click the piano,” people often look at a 
trumpet (Huettig & Altmann, 2005).  And when instructed to “click the lock,” people 
often look at a key (Yee & Sedivy, 2001).  In fact, Yee and Sedivy (2006) showed that, 
due to the phonological similarity, “click the logs” can activate the lexical representation 
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for lock (even though there is no lock present) and thus indirectly trigger eye movements 
to the key!  High-dimensional state-space accounts of semantic similarity provide 
accurate predictions of the frequency of eye movements to these competitor objects 
(Huettig, Quinlan, McDonald, & Altmann, 2006), whether the state-space is based on 
feature norms (Cree & McRae, 2003) or on n-gram-based corpus statistics (Lund & 
Burgess, 1996). 
 As was seen with syntactic ambiguity resolution, there is a weakness with eye-
movement data in that each individual trial can either show evidence of a brief 
misinterpretation of the spoken word (a sort of “lexical garden-path”) or not.  On any 
given trial, the participant either looks at the competitor object or doesn’t.  Thus, one 
could still adhere to an account that suggests the lexicon conducts its mapping of 
acoustic-phonetic input onto lexical items and completes any competition processes 
internally before sending its finalized output to other subsystems (such as reaching and 
eye-movement subsystems).  An account like this would suggest that the reaching and 
eye-movement subsystems never receive the cascaded parallel output of multiple partially 
activated lexical representations. Rather, the lexicon gives single unitary commands to 
those action subsystems, sometimes quickly and sometimes slowly, and occasionally 
must send revision signals to instigate corrective eye movements and corrective reaching 
movements (van der Wel, Eder, Mitchel, Walsh, & Rosenbaum, 2009).  To test an 
account like this, the Visual World Paradigm must extend itself to other measures that are 
not as ballistic and discrete as saccadic eye movements are.  Recording computer-mouse 
movements can allow the detection of graded curvatures in the response movements. 
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 Spivey, Grosjean and Knoblich (2005) found that when participants were 
instructed to “click the candle,” their computer-mouse movements showed graded 
curvature toward the midpoint between the candle and the candy, before finally settling 
into the image of the candle.  This curvature was reliably greater for cohort conditions 
(candle/candy) than for control conditions (candle/towel).  Moreover, computational 
modeling of dynamically averaged motor commands produces remarkable fits to the 
mouse-tracking data (Spivey, Dale, Knoblich, & Grosjean, 2010).  A theoretical 
comparison of the kinds of data extracted from eye-tracking and from mouse-tracking 
show that they have complementary strengths and weaknesses, and can easily be 
conducted at the same time (Magnuson, 2005). In fact, this mouse-tracking version of the 
Visual World Paradigm has revealed continuous real-time competition between 
representations that are active in parallel in other domains as well, such as color 
categorization (Huette & McMurray, 2010), semantic categorization (Dale, Kehoe, & 
Spivey, 2007), gender stereotypes (Freeman & Ambady, 2009), social attitudes 
(Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, & Spivey, 2009), and even decision making (McKinstry, 
Dale, & Spivey, 2008). 
 
Phoneme Perception in the Visual World Paradigm 
 As we zoom in the timescale from sentences to words to phonemes, we see that 
the observation of parallel partial activation of multiple representations extends even to 
the level of the dozens of milliseconds of acoustic-phonetic input that distinguishes one 
phoneme from another.  For example, a mere 40 ms of delayed voicing (vibration of the 
vocal chords) is what chiefly discriminates the spoken syllable /pa/ from the spoken 
syllable /ba/.  Classic findings have shown that when this voice onset time (VOT) is 
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varied parametrically with synthesized speech, listeners exhibit a categorical distinction 
in how they identify and discriminate speech tokens on the continuum between the 
canonical /ba/ and the canonical /pa/ (Liberman, Delattre, & Cooper, 1958). At first 
glance, it looked as though listeners were not even processing the within-category 
gradations in the acoustic-phonetic input (i.e., the sensory differences between a /ba/ with 
10 ms VOT and a /ba/ with 20 ms VOT).   
 However, a couple decades later, Pisoni and Tash (1976) reported one early hint 
that the speech processing system was being somehow affected by the imperfectness of a 
/ba/ that has a VOT somewhat near the /pa/ range.  Although participants consistently 
labeled /ba/ tokens near the category boundary as “ba,” they produced longer reaction 
times when doing it.  This suggested some kind of time course to the speech 
categorization process, during which the within-category acoustic variation was not quite 
being entirely discarded. 
 Another couple decades later, Bob McMurray extended the Visual World 
Paradigm to speech perception, and obtained not only reaction times during identification 
of stimuli from a /ba/-/pa/ continuum, but also proportions of eye fixations on the 
response icons (McMurray & Spivey, 1999).  With canonical versions of /ba/ and of /pa/, 
participants would look only at their correct chosen response icon and click it with the 
mouse cursor.  With versions of /ba/ and /pa/ that were near the category boundary, 
participants tended to quickly fixate both the /ba/ and /pa/ icons on the computer screen 
before finally clicking their consistently selected icon.  McMurray and colleagues further 
demonstrated that this evidence for partial activation of both phonological representations 
(voiced and unvoiced) lasted long enough to influence spoken word recognition, such as 
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when hearing the word “bear” or “pear” with a VOT continuum (McMurray, Tanenhaus, 
& Aslin, 2002).  In fact, with each additional 5 ms of VOT, participants exhibited a 
systematic gradient increase in their likelihood of fixating the pear image before clicking 
the bear image.  And once the VOT was across the category boundary, each additional 5 
ms of VOT caused a systematic gradient decrease in likelihood of fixating the bear image 
before clicking the pear image (McMurray, Aslin, Tanenhaus, Spivey & Subik, 2008).  
Thus, it would appear that about as fine-grained in temporal resolution as one can go in 
the stimulus -- 5 ms increments of speech sounds -- the Visual World Paradigm provides 
evidence that is consistent with a theoretical framework in which spoken language 
comprehension is continuously sensitive to the cascaded sensory, perceptual, and 
cognitive processes involved in turning sound waves into internal representations of 
meaning. 
 
Spoken Sentence Production in the Visual World Paradigm 
 So far, this review has been focused on findings in language comprehension.  
However, tracking people’s eye movements is also informative for understanding real-
time language production.  Soon after the Visual World Paradigm was developed, several 
researchers adapted it for observing what parts of a visual scene attract overt attention 
during the few seconds it takes to formulate and produce a spoken utterance.  In fact, in 
the right circumstances, the eye-movement pattern can even be used to make predictions 
about what grammatical form the participant’s upcoming spoken utterance will take! 
 Meyer, Sleiderink, and Levelt (1998) showed that when participants viewed two 
objects on the computer screen and were instructed to name the left object first and then 
the right object, they routinely fixated the left object and then the right object, and then 
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began naming them.  Thus, their eyes were typically fixating the second object when they 
began naming the first object.  Moreover, when an object was a given entity in the 
discourse, because it had already been mentioned, it tended to be fixated for briefer 
periods of time than when that object was a new entity in the discourse, because it had not 
yet been referred to (van der Meulen, Meyer, & Levelt, 2001). 
 Griffin and Bock (2000) presented participants with line drawings of two entities 
that were interacting with one another, such as a donkey kicking a horse, and asked 
participants to describe the scene any way they wanted to.  Not surprisingly, the majority 
of participants used an active voice, as in “The donkey kicked the horse,” and before they 
began their spoken utterance, their eye position tended to start on the donkey and then 
move to the horse.  However, on those trials where participants wound up producing a 
passive voice sentence, as in “The horse was kicked by the donkey,” their eye-movement 
pattern tended to reveal that alternative grammatical formulation even before the 
utterance began.  Participants who were about to use the passive voice, but had not yet 
opened their mouths, tended to initially fixate the horse and then fixate the donkey (see 
also Griffin, 2004).  Results like these show that, as people formulate an utterance, their 
eyes naturally move to the objects that they are thinking about and preparing to talk about 




Dialogue and Reference in the Visual World Paradigm 
 The research discussed so far tends to implicitly treat language use as if it were a 
unidirectional process.  Either the participant is seeing a visual scene and then producing 
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a sentence to describe it, or she is comprehending a sentence spoken in the context of a 
visual scene, but never both.  The findings described so far generally provide support for 
a situated approach to understanding the various processes of language.  That is, when 
one analyzes sentence comprehension, it is crucial to pay attention to the context in 
which that process is situated.  The system that is performing those sentence-level 
linguistic computations is embedded (a technical term from dynamical systems theory) in 
a larger system that is performing sensorimotor computations on the relevant properties 
of the physical environment. The same applies when one analyzes semantic 
comprehension, or spoken word recognition, or phoneme perception, or sentence 
production.  The system of interest is always embedded (or situated, or contextualized) in 
a larger encompassing system that is dramatically influencing its real-time behavior.  And 
things get even more interesting – and of course more complicated – when there are two 
systems of interest, one in each of the interlocutors!  When two people are engaged in a 
language-mediated joint task, each of these systems of interest become not only 
embedded in their larger context but they also become tightly coupled with one another 
(another technical term from dynamical systems theory). 
 For several years, practitioners of the Visual World Paradigm were reticent to 
release the experimental controls of prepared and recorded stimuli and fixed visual 
displays.  However, the moment one begins to study reference resolution in this 
paradigm, it becomes clear that there is a remarkably fluid temporal continuity with 
which listeners map each new speech sound onto possible matches in the visual context.  
This clearly would have consequences for natural interactive conversation, where 
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interlocutors share the visual context and often anticipate one another in ways that are 
impressively constructive. 
 This fluid continuity in reference resolution in the Visual World Paradigm was 
first demonstrated by Kathleen Eberhard and colleagues, when she instructed participants 
to “touch the starred yellow square” amid an array of several colored blocks (Eberhard et 
al., 1995).  Some of the blocks might have stars, some might be yellow, but only one is 
starred, yellow and in the shape of a square.  She found that participants were mapping 
the adjectives onto the relevant objects in the scene before the head noun was even 
spoken.  If there was only one block with a star on it, then participants were settling their 
eye position on the referent block about 200 ms after hearing the word “starred” -- around 
the time the adjective “yellow” was being spoken.  Thus, listeners were using the features 
of the objects in the display to dynamically restrict the referential domain of relevant 
objects to respond at the contextually-relevant point-of-disambiguation in the spoken 
noun phrase. This real-time incrementality with which these adjectives were being 
interpreted -- apparently without needing the head noun to which they are syntactically 
attached -- even led to follow-up experiments that showed how the visual system can use 
those adjectives to guide visual search and make it more efficient when searching for “a 
red vertical bar” (Spivey, Tyler, Eberhard, and Tanenhaus, 2001).  Thus, not only can 
visual context tell language processing what to do, but linguistic context can tell visual 
processing what to do as well (Anderson, Chiu, Huette, & Spivey, 2011). 
 Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Brauner (2000) then extended this type of reference 
resolution paradigm into a social context with an experimental confederate, where a 
listener might be expected to map their understanding of a spoken instruction onto the 
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common ground (or mutual knowledge) shared between the two interlocutors.  If a 
listener can see that a particular object is not visible to the speaker, then one might expect 
that she would not consider it as a potential referent, because the speaker is unlikely to 
refer to an object that he cannot see.  However, Keysar et al. found that listeners 
frequently made eye movements to privileged objects (which the speaker could not see) 
when those objects had names similar to what the speaker was instructing them to pick 
up.  This finding helped spark a flurry of research in social psychology suggesting that 
people are frequently egocentric in their interpretation of language and other social 
situations (e.g, Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 
2010). 
 Interestingly, rather than interpreting this egocentrism as evidence that common 
ground is not accommodated among interlocutors, subsequent work suggests that 
common ground does indeed play an important immediate role in language 
comprehension, but it does so in concert with many other linguistic and perceptual 
factors.  For example, Hanna, Tanenhaus, and Trueswell (2003) directly compared a 
common-ground condition – where there was a target object and a communally visible 
competitor object – to a privileged-ground condition where the competitor object was a  
“secret shape” that was not in common ground but instead only in the listener’s 
privileged ground.  Although the privileged-ground “secret shape” reliably interfered 
with reference resolution, indicating that common ground information was unable to 
summarily rule out the privileged object from attracting attention, the common ground 
competitor object exerted reliably more interference than the privileged competitor shape 
did.  Thus, common ground information was clearly influencing the earliest eye 
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movement patterns, just in a probabilistic fashion.  Essentially, when the acoustic-
phonetic input maps substantially onto the name of an object in the listener’s field of 
view, this is one constraint that will contribute to the likelihood that the eyes move to that 
object. And when the common ground among speaker and listener suggests that this same 
object is not likely to be referred to by the speaker (because the speaker cannot see that 
object), this is one factor that will contribute to the likelihood that the eyes do not move 
to that object.  Neither of these opposing constraints is able to completely eliminate the 
effects of the other.  Therefore, even though common ground is indeed being taken into 
account immediately (along with many other constraints), the listener will still 
occasionally look at an object that is only in her privileged ground. 
 Similar findings of the immediate use of common ground information to partially 
reduce the perceived relevance of a privileged object were also reported by Nadig and 
Sedivy (2002) with 5- and 6-year-olds.  Then Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004) extended 
these observations in a natural collaborative task involving a cooking scenario with real 
physical kitchen implements and ingredients.  In general, as the task and context become 
more natural and ecologically valid, it appears that any and all relevant information 
sources – from low-level lexical and syntactic constraints to high-level broadly 
encompassing constraints such as common ground -- are integrated into the evolving 
interpretation of incoming linguistic input as soon as they are available (e.g., Kaiser & 
Trueswell, 2008; see also Kaiser, this volume). 
 In fact, as the conversational context in the laboratory becomes even more 
realistic, an obvious component to add is natural speech disfluencies and speech repairs.  
As a matter of fact, eye-movement data show that listeners will interpret a brief speech 
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disfluency as an indicator for a given/new distinction in the conversation (Arnold, 
Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano, 2004), and they will partially update their real-time 
interpretation when a spoken verb is repaired as a different verb (Corley, 2010).  But it 
takes a measure of bravery to truly put this claim about realistic conversation to the test, 
and actually allow experimental participants to engage in natural, ecologically valid, 
unscripted two-way conversation – with its spontaneous disfluencies, repairs, and general 
free-formedness -- while still making every effort to maintain experimental control and 
real-time measurements in the laboratory.  Brown-Schmidt, Campana, and Tanenhaus 
(2005) did exactly that with a large array of blocks and pictures of various objects that 
two participants used in an unscripted interactive problem-solving task.  After analyzing 
the transcripts of the conversations, they found a couple hundred instances where 
complex noun phrases were temporarily ambiguous with respect to the set of objects to 
which they could refer – a bit like Eberhard et al.’s (1995) reference to “the starred 
yellow square” amidst a set of colored blocks of various shapes.  They found that even in 
this unscripted natural conversation situation, listeners would dynamically restrict the 
referential domain to look at objects referred to in the speech stream very soon after the 
contextually-relevant point-of-disambiguation – just as observed in the scripted 
instruction task used by Eberhard et al.  Interestingly, however, this ebb and flow of 
dynamic restricting of the referential domain was so ubiquitous that whenever the 
transcript provided an opportunity to test for spoken word cohort effects (e.g., Allopenna 
et al., 1998; Eberhard et al., 1995; Spivey-Knowlton, 1996), which consisted of 75 
adventitious references to pictures that had cohort competitors also in the display at the 
time, there wasn’t a single instance where a listener looked at a cohort competitor.  
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Essentially, realistic unscripted conversation naturally tends to restrict the domain of 
reference, via shared goals and shared attention, such that it is rare for two objects with 
cohort names to be situationally relevant at the same time (for further discussion, see 
Brown-Schmidt’s chapter in this volume). 
 The shared goals and shared attention of a natural unscripted dialogue tend to 
induce a shared common experience of the conversational situation that is supported by a 
wide variety of coordinated behaviors.  Not only do interlocutors tend to unintentionally 
mimic each other’s syntactic choices in production (e.g., Dale & Spivey, 2006; Pickering 
& Garrod, 2004), they also unintentionally slip into a wide variety of emergent behavior-
matching actions (Shockley, Richardson, & Dale, 2009; see also Clark, 2012).  For 
example, their eye-movement patterns on a shared visual display become coordinated 
(Richardson, Dale & Kirkham 2007).  Their manual and facial movements become 
coordinated (Louwerse, Dale, Bard, & Jeuniaux, 2012).  Even the subtle postural sway 
patterns around the two bodies’ centers of gravity become coordinated (Shockley, 
Santana, & Fowler, 2003).  Essentially, as two people become engaged in a natural 
dialogue, with numerous references to their shared situational context, their various 
subsystems of linguistic, perceptual, and motor processes become tightly coupled across 




 In this chapter, we have walked through a progression of numerous subfields in 
psycholinguistics where the Visual World Paradigm has assisted in important advances in 
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our understanding of how linguistic and perceptual information interact immediately to 
conjure up an evolving understanding of what an utterance means in the context of the 
situation.  All of these applications of the paradigm are currently active areas of research, 
as can be seen in the other chapters in this volume.  The common methodological thread 
among these research areas is that they have all derived their unique insight into the 
online processing of linguist input by employing a dense-sampling method that provides 
multiple measures (usually eye movements) within the time course of each trial.  If this 
wide variety of findings share one common theoretical thread, it is this:  The temporal 
continuity in the uptake and processing of linguistic input and of perceptual input is 
exactly what allows these partially-processed portions of information to be mapped onto 
each other in real time. 
 The real-time moment-by-moment delivery of spoken language is often likened to 
“beads on a string” delivered incrementally, one at a time, and the language user’s task is 
to comprehend the full pattern of the necklace.  This is a useful metaphor, but it has one 
misleading characteristic inherent to it. Whenever one looks at the fine grain temporal 
dynamics of the delivery of a putative “bead” of language (be it a clause, or a word, or a 
phoneme), it becomes clear that the bead is made of several smaller beads that are 
processed incrementally.  In actuality, there are no beads.  Rather than “beads on a 
string,” a more apt metaphor might be water flowing down a river, or maybe Cantor dust 
sliding through an hourglass.  In fact, the term “incremental” doesn’t quite do justice to 
this incredibly fluid process.  There appears to be a temporally continuous cascading of 
multiple partially active representations as linguistic information flows through the 
language processing systems.  Indeed it may be that at no point does any particular 
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information source (e.g., phonological, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic) hold back from 
sharing its activation patterns with other information sources.   
 This observation of “processes in cascade” (McClelland, 1979) has important 
consequences for our understanding of the architecture of the language processing 
system.  Not only must we let go of the information encapsulation once proposed by 
Fodor (1983) for lexical and syntactic modules, but if that information permeability is 
constantly flowing in cascade between the various subsystems, then even the domain 
specificity of these putative modules becomes somewhat compromised.  That is, if a 
syntax module is continuously receiving semantic and pragmatic input (on the time scale 
of milliseconds) that it uses to modify the syntactic structures it is in the process of 
forming, then the rules and constraints it is following are obviously not purely specific to 
the domain of syntax.  In such a scenario, there is no point in time during which a 
measurement of that syntax module’s internal computations would reveal representations 
that had been constructed by purely syntactic forces.  There would always be some 
detectable influence from non-syntactic constraints on those representations that are 
inside the syntax module. 
 Importantly, the resulting compromise of the domain specificity of the syntax 
module should not be taken as an argument for syntax simply not existing.  Even 
advocates of encoding syntax and semantics inside the same computational substrate 
(e.g., Elman, 1990; Tabor & Hutchins, 2004) would not themselves interpret the tight 
coupling of these two information sources as evidence that one of them doesn’t exist.  
Let’s take an example from vision research.  Vision scientists have been discovering that 
their visual modules are more interactive and less domain-specific than once thought.  As 
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a result, findings of motion perception interacting with color information (Møller and 
Hurlbert, 1997) and with transparency information (Trueswell & Hayhoe, 1993) are 
generally interpreted as evidence that there is still a visual subsystem that processes 
mostly visual motion information, but it also processes some other sources of information 
a little bit.  Similarly, psycholinguistics is slowly coming to grips with the idea that any 
given linguistic module is promiscuous enough with its information flow to process some 
sources of information that are not what it is primarily known for.  In such an account, 
these modules are partially specialized, but they are not quite domain-specific and 
certainly not informationally encapsulated. 
 From phoneme recognition all the way up to natural unscripted conversation, and 
everywhere in between, the Visual World Paradigm has provided a treasure trove of 
important insights into how various linguistic processes are immediately influenced by 
the contextual processes in which they are situated or embedded.  As a result, the 
modular view of language is slowly giving way to a general situated view of language, 
which is arguably on its way to becoming mainstream in the field of experimental 
psycholinguistics. A dynamical systems theory approach to situated language, which is 
well stocked with mathematical tools for understanding how situatedness may be an 
embedding of one system inside a larger system, is however still in its infancy.  The 
findings of interactivity between various linguistic processes and the context in which 
they are embedded make it difficult for the field to continue with its implicit adherence to 
the old modular box-and-arrow model of language comprehension, where phonology is a 
domain-specific processor that sends its output to syntax, which is a domain-specific 
processor that sends its output to semantics, which is a domain-specific processor that 
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   37	  
sends its output to pragmatics (see Onnis & Spivey, 2012).  However, the field has not 
yet settled on what formalism, or schematic diagram, will replace that old chestnut.  
Nonetheless, one thing seems for sure: You don’t have to go dynamical, but you can’t 
stay modular. 
 
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   38	  
 
References 
Allopenna,	  P.	  D.,	  Magnuson,	  J.	  S.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  K.	  (1998).	  	  Tracking	  the	  time	  
course	  of	  spoken	  word	  recognition	  using	  eye	  movements:	  Evidence	  for	  
continuous	  mapping	  models.	  	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  38,	  419-­‐439.	  
Altmann,	  G.	  T.	  M.	  (2004).	  Language-­‐mediated	  eye	  movements	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
visual	  world:	  the	  ‘blank	  screen	  paradigm’.	  Cognition,	  93,	  79–87.	  
Altmann,	  G.	  T.	  M.,	  &	  Kamide,	  Y.	  (1999).	  Incremental	  interpretation	  at	  verbs:	  
restricting	  the	  domain	  of	  subsequent	  reference.	  Cognition,	  73,	  247–264.	  
Altmann,	  G.	  &	  Steedman,	  M.	  (1988).	  Interaction	  with	  context	  during	  human	  sentence	  
processing.	  Cognition,	  30,	  191-­‐238.	  
Altmann,	  G.,	  Garnham,	  A.,	  &	  Dennis,	  Y.	  (1992).	  	  Avoiding	  the	  garden-­‐path:	  Eye	  
movements	  in	  context.	  	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  31,	  685-­‐712.	  
Anderson,	  S.	  E.,	  Chiu,	  E.,	  Huette,	  S.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2011).	  On	  the	  temporal	  dynamics	  
of	  language-­‐mediated	  vision	  and	  vision-­‐mediated	  language.	  Acta	  
Psychologica,	  137,	  181-­‐189.	  
Arnold	  J.	  E.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.K.,	  Altmann	  R.	  J.,	  &	  Fagnano,	  M.	  (2004).	  The	  old	  and	  thee,	  
uh,	  new.	  Psychological	  Science,15,	  578–582.	  
Ballard,	  D.H.,	  Hayhoe,	  M.M.,	  Pelz,	  J.B.	  (1995).	  Memory	  representations	  in	  natural	  
tasks.	  Journal	  of	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience,	  7,	  66-­‐80.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   39	  
Barr,	  D.	  (this	  volume).	  	  Visual	  world	  studies	  of	  conversational	  perspective	  taking.	  
Barsalou,	  L.	  (1999).	  Language	  comprehension:	  Archival	  memory	  or	  preparation	  for	  
situated	  action?	  Discourse	  Processes,	  28,	  61-­‐80.	  
Beer,	  R.D.	  (2000).	  Dynamical	  approaches	  to	  cognitive	  science.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  
Sciences,	  4,	  91-­‐99.	  
Bever,	  T.G.,	  Lackner,	  J.R.,	  &	  Kirk,	  R.	  (1969).	  The	  underlying	  structures	  of	  sentences	  
are	  the	  primary	  units	  of	  immediate	  sentence	  processing.	  Attention,	  
Perception,	  &	  Psychophysics,	  5,	  225-­‐234.	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  S.	  (this	  volume).	  	  Visual	  environment	  and	  interlocutors	  in	  situated	  
dialogue.	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  S.,	  Campana,	  E.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  K.	  (2005).	  Real-­‐time	  reference	  
resolution	  by	  naïve	  participants	  during	  a	  task-­‐based	  unscripted	  
conversation.	  In:	  Trueswell,	  J.	  &	  Tanenhaus	  M.	  (Eds.),	  Approaches	  to	  studying	  
world-­situated	  language	  use:	  Bridging	  the	  language-­as-­product	  and	  language-­
as-­action	  traditions.	  pp.	  153–171.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  
Bullock,	  M.	  &	  Gelman,	  R.	  (1979).	  Preschool	  children’s	  assumptions	  about	  cause	  and	  
effect:	  Temporal	  ordering.	  Child	  Development,	  50,	  89-­‐96.	  
Chambers,	  C.	  (this	  volume).	  The	  role	  of	  affordances	  in	  visually-­‐situated	  language	  
comprehension.	  
Chambers,	  C.	  G.,	  &	  San	  Juan,	  V.	  (2008).	  Perception	  and	  presupposition	  in	  real-­‐time	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   40	  
language	  comprehension:	  Insights	  from	  anticipatory	  processing.	  Cognition,	  
108,	  26–50.	  
Chambers,	  C.	  G.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  K.,	  &	  Magnuson,	  J.	  S.	  (2004).	  Actions	  and	  affordances	  
in	  syntactic	  ambiguity	  resolution.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  
Learning,	  Memory,	  and	  Cognition,	  30,	  687–696.	  
Chomsky,	  N.	  (1965).	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Syntax.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  	  MIT	  Press.	  	  
Clark,	  H.	  H.,	  &	  Haviland,	  S.	  E.	  (1977).	  Comprehension	  and	  the	  given-­‐new	  contract.	  In	  
R.O.	  Freedle	  (Ed.),	  Discourse	  production	  and	  comprehension	  (pp.	  1-­‐40).	  
Hillsdale,	  NJ:	  Erlbaum.	  
Clark,	  H.H.	  (1992).	  Arenas	  of	  Language	  Use.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
Clark,	  H.	  H.	  (2012).	  Spoken	  discourse	  and	  its	  emergence.	  In	  Spivey,	  M.,	  McRae,	  K.,	  &	  
Joanisse,	  M.	  (Eds.),	  Cambridge	  Handbook	  of	  Psycholinguistics.	  (pp.541-­‐557).	  
NY,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Cooper,	  R.	  (1974).	  The	  control	  of	  eye	  fixation	  by	  the	  meaning	  of	  spoken	  language.	  
Cognitive	  Psychology,	  6,	  84–107.	  
Corbetta,	  M.	  (1998).	  Frontoparietal	  cortical	  networks	  for	  directing	  attention	  and	  the	  
eye	  to	  visual	  locations:	  Identical,	  independent,	  or	  overlapping	  neural	  
systems?	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  95,	  831-­‐838.	  
Corley,	  M.	  (2010).	  Making	  predictions	  from	  speech	  with	  repairs:	  Evidence	  from	  eye	  
movements.	  Language	  and	  Cognitive	  Processes,	  25,	  706–727.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   41	  
Crain,	  S.	  &	  Steedman,	  M.	  (1985).	  On	  not	  being	  led	  up	  the	  garden	  path:	  the	  use	  of	  
context	  by	  the	  psychological	  syntax	  processor.	  In	  D.R.	  Dowty,	  L.	  Karttunnen,	  
&	  A.M.	  Zwicky	  (Eds.),	  Natural	  Language	  Parsing	  (pp.	  320-­‐345).	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press.	  
Cree,	  G.	  S.,	  &	  McRae,	  K.	  (2003).	  Analyzing	  the	  factors	  underlying	  the	  structure	  and	  
computation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  chipmunk,	  cherry,	  chisel,	  cheese,	  and	  cello	  
(and	  many	  other	  such	  concrete	  nouns).	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  
General,	  132,	  163–201.	  
Dahan,	  D.,	  Magnuson,	  J.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  (2001).	  	  Time	  course	  of	  frequency	  effects	  
in	  spoken-­‐word	  recognition:	  	  Evidence	  from	  eye	  movements.	  	  Cognitive	  
Psychology,	  42,	  317-­‐367.	  	  	  
Dahan,	  D.,	  Swingley,	  D.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  K.,	  &	  Magnuson,	  J.	  S.	  (2000).	  Linguistic	  gender	  
and	  spoken	  word	  recognition	  in	  French.	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  42,	  
465±480.	  
Dale,	  R.,	  Kehoe,	  C.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2007).	  Graded	  motor	  responses	  in	  the	  time	  course	  
of	  categorizing	  atypical	  exemplars.	  	  Memory	  and	  Cognition,	  35,	  15-­28.	  
Dale,	  R.	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  (2006).	  Unraveling	  the	  dyad:	  Using	  recurrence	  analysis	  to	  
explore	  patterns	  of	  syntactic	  coordination	  between	  children	  and	  caregivers	  
in	  conversation.	  Language	  Learning,	  56,	  391-­‐430.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   42	  
Eberhard,	  K.,	  Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  M.,	  Sedivy,	  J.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  (1995).	  	  Eye	  
movements	  as	  a	  window	  into	  real-­‐time	  spoken	  language	  comprehension	  in	  
natural	  contexts.	  	  Journal	  of	  Psycholinguistic	  Research,	  24,	  409-­‐436.	  	  	  
Elman,	  J.	  (1990).	  	  Finding	  structure	  in	  time.	  	  Cognitive	  Science,	  14,	  179-­‐211.	  	  	  
Elman,	  J.L.	  (2004).	  An	  alternative	  view	  of	  the	  mental	  lexicon.	  Trends	  in	  cognitive	  
sciences,	  8,	  301-­‐306.	  
Engelhardt,	  P.	  &	  Ferreira,	  F.	  (this	  volume).	  Reaching	  sentence	  and	  reference	  
meaning.	  
Epley,	  N.,	  Keysar,	  B.,	  Van	  Boven,	  L.,	  Gilovich,	  T.	  (2004).	  Perspective	  taking	  as	  
egocentric	  anchoring	  and	  adjustment.	  Journal	  of	  Personality	  and	  Social	  
Psychology,	  87,	  327-­‐339.	  
Erdelyi,	  M.H.	  (1974).	  A	  new	  look	  at	  the	  new	  look:	  Perceptual	  defense	  and	  vigilance.	  
Psychological	  Review,	  81,	  1-­‐25.	  
Farmer	  ,	  T.,	  Anderson,	  S.,	  Freeman,	  J.	  &	  Dale,	  R.	  (this	  volume).	  	  Coordinating	  action	  
and	  language.	  
Farmer,	  T.,	  Anderson,	  S.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2007).	  	  Gradiency	  and	  visual	  context	  in	  
syntactic	  garden-­‐paths.	  	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  57,	  570-­‐595.	  
Ferreira,	  F.,	  &	  Clifton,	  C.	  (1986).	  	  The	  independence	  of	  syntactic	  processing.	  	  Journal	  
of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  25,	  348-­‐368.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   43	  
Fodor,	  J.	  (1983).	  	  The	  modularity	  of	  mind:	  An	  essay	  on	  faculty	  psychology.	  	  Cambridge,	  
MA:	  	  MIT	  Press.	  	  	  
Forster,	  K.	  (1979).	  Levels	  of	  processing	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  language	  processor.	  
In	  W.	  Cooper	  &	  E.	  Walker	  (Eds.),	  Sentence	  Processing:	  Psycholinguistic	  Studies	  
Presented	  to	  Merrill	  Garrett.	  (pp.27-­‐850).	  	  Erlbaum	  Press:	  Hillsdale,	  NJ.	  
Frazier,	  L.,	  &	  Rayner,	  K.	  (1982).	  Making	  and	  correcting	  errors	  during	  sentence	  
comprehension:	  Eye	  movements	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  structurally	  ambiguous	  
sentences.	  Cognitive	  Psychology,	  14,	  178-­‐210.	  
Freeman,	  J.	  B.,	  &	  Ambady,	  N.	  (2009).	  Motions	  of	  the	  hand	  expose	  the	  partial	  and	  
parallel	  activation	  of	  stereotypes.	  Psychological	  Science,	  20,	  1183–1188.	  
Gaskell,	  M.,	  &	  Marslen-­‐Wilson,	  W.	  (2002).	  	  Representation	  and	  competition	  in	  the	  
perception	  of	  spoken	  words.	  	  Cognitive	  Psychology,	  45,	  220-­‐266.	  	  	  
Gigerenzer,	  G.	  (1992).	  Discovery	  in	  cognitive	  psychology:	  New	  tools	  inspire	  new	  
theories.	  Science	  in	  Context,	  5,	  329–350.	  
Goodman,	  G.	  O.,	  McClelland,	  J.	  L.	  &	  Gibbs,	  R.	  W.	  (1981).	  The	  role	  of	  syntactic	  context	  
in	  visual	  word	  recognition.	  Memory	  and	  Cognition,	  9,	  580-­‐586.	  	  
Griffin,	  Z.	  (2004).	  Why	  look?	  Reasons	  for	  eye	  movements	  related	  to	  language	  
production.	  In	  J.	  M.	  Henderson	  &	  F.	  Ferreira	  (Eds.),	  The	  Interface	  of	  Language,	  
Vision,	  and	  Action:	  Eye	  Movements	  and	  the	  Visual	  World.	  New	  York:	  
Psychology	  Press	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   44	  
Griffin,	  Z.,	  &	  Bock,	  K.	  (2000).	  	  What	  the	  eyes	  say	  about	  speaking.	  	  Psychological	  
Science,	  11,	  274-­‐279.	  	  	  
Hanna,	  J.	  E.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  K.	  (2004).	  Pragmatic	  effects	  on	  reference	  resolution	  in	  
a	  collaborative	  task:	  Evidence	  from	  eye	  movements.	  Cognitive	  Science,	  28,	  
105–115.	  
Hanna,	  J.	  E.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  K.,	  &	  Trueswell,	  J.	  C.	  (2003).	  The	  effects	  of	  common	  
ground	  and	  perspective	  on	  domains	  of	  referential	  interpretation.	  Journal	  of	  
Memory	  and	  Language,	  49,	  43–61.	  
Heim,	  I.	  (1982).	  The	  semantics	  of	  definite	  and	  indefinite	  noun	  phrases.	  Amherst,	  MA.	  
GLSA.	  
Hoffman,	  J.E.	  &	  Subramaniam,	  B.	  (1995).	  The	  role	  of	  visual	  attention	  in	  saccadic	  eye	  
movements.	  Attention,	  Perception,	  &	  Psychophysics,	  57,	  787-­‐795.	  
Huette, S., & McMurray, B. (2010). Continuous dynamics of color categorization. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 348-354. 
Huette,	  S.	  &	  Matlock,	  T.	  (this	  volume).	  Figurative	  language	  processing.	  
Huette,	  S.,	  Winter,	  B.,	  Matlock,	  T.,	  Ardell,	  D.	  H.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  (2014).	  Eye	  movements	  
during	  listening	  reveal	  spontaneous	  grammatical	  processing.	  Frontiers	  in	  
Psychology,	  5,	  410.	  	  
Huettig,	  F.,	  &	  Altmann,	  G.	  T.	  M.	  (2005).	  Word	  meaning	  and	  the	  control	  of	  eye	  
fixation:	  semantic	  competitor	  effects	  and	  the	  visual	  world	  paradigm.	  
Cognition,	  96,	  B23-­‐B32.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   45	  
Huettig,	  F.,	  Quinlan,	  P.	  T.,	  McDonald,	  S.	  A.,	  &	  Altmann,	  G.	  T.	  M.	  (2006).	  Models	  of	  high-­‐	  
dimensional	  semantic	  space	  predict	  language-­‐mediated	  eye	  movements	  in	  
the	  visual	  world.	  Acta	  Psychologica,	  121,	  65-­‐80.	  
Jones,	  M.	  &	  Love,	  B.C.	  (2011).	  Bayesian	  fundamentalism	  or	  enlightenment?	  On	  the	  
explanatory	  status	  and	  theoretical	  contributions	  of	  Bayesian	  models	  of	  
cognition,	  Behavioral	  and	  Brain	  Sciences,	  34,	  169-­‐231.	  
Ju,	  M.,	  &	  Luce,	  P.	  A.	  (2004).	  Falling	  on	  sensitive	  ears:	  Constraints	  on	  bilingual	  lexical	  
activation.	  Psychological	  Science,	  15,	  314–318.	  
Kaiser	  E.	  &	  	  Trueswell	  J.	  (2008).	  Interpreting	  pronouns	  and	  demonstratives	  in	  
Finnish:	  Evidence	  for	  a	  form-­‐specific	  approach	  to	  reference	  resolution.	  
Language	  and	  Cognitive	  Processes,	  23,	  709–748.	  
Kaiser,	  E.	  (this	  volume).	  Discourse	  level	  processing.	  
Kamide,	  Y.,	  Altmann,	  G.	  T.	  M.,	  &	  Haywood,	  S.	  L.	  (2003).	  The	  time-­‐course	  of	  prediction	  
in	  incremental	  sentence	  processing:	  evidence	  from	  anticipatory	  eye	  
movements.	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  49,	  133–159.	  
Kamide,	  Y.	  (this	  volume).	  
Keysar,	  B.,	  Barr,	  D.	  J.,	  Balin,	  J.	  A.,	  &	  Brauner,	  J.	  S.	  (2000).	  Taking	  perspective	  in	  
conversation:	  the	  role	  of	  mutual	  knowledge	  in	  comprehension.	  Psychological	  
Sciences,	  11,	  32–38.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   46	  
Knoeferle, P. (this volume).  Accounting for visual context effects on situated language 
comprehension. 
Knoeferle, P., & Crocker, M. W. (2006). The coordinated interplay of scene, utterance, 
and world knowledge:	  Evidence from eye-tracking.	  Cognitive	  Science,	  30, 481–
529. 	  
Knoeferle, P., & Crocker, M. W. (2007). The influence of recent scene events on spoken 
comprehension:	  Evidence from eye movements.	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  
Language, 57,	  519–543. 
Lakoff,	  G.	  (1971).	  On	  generative	  semantics.	  In	  D.	  Steinberg	  &	  L.	  Jacobovits,	  (Eds.),	  
Semantics.	  (pp.	  232-­‐296).	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
Lenoir,	  T.	  (1986).	  Models	  and	  Instruments	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  Electrophysiology,	  
1845-­‐1912.	  Historical	  studies	  in	  the	  Physical	  and	  Biological	  Sciences,	  17,	  1-­‐54.	  
Levy,	  R.	  (2011).	  Integrating	  surprisal	  and	  uncertain-­‐input	  models	  in	  online	  sentence	  
comprehension:	  formal	  techniques	  and	  empirical	  results.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
49th	  Annual	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Association	  for	  Computational	  Linguistics,	  1055-­‐
1065.	  	  
Liberman, A., Delattre, P., & Cooper, F.	  (1958) . 	  Some rules for the distinction between 
voiced and voiceless	  stops	  in	  initial	  position.	  Language	  and	  Speech, 1, 153–
167. 
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   47	  
Lin,	  S.,	  Keysar,	  B.,	  &	  Epley,	  N.	  (2010).	  Reflexively	  mindblind:	  Using	  theory	  of	  mind	  to	  
interpret	  behavior	  requires	  effortful	  attention.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Social	  
Psychology,	  46,	  551–556.	  
Louwerse,	  M.	  (2008).	  Embodied	  relations	  are	  encoded	  in	  language.	  Psychonomic	  
Bulletin	  &	  Review,	  15,	  838-­‐844.	  
Louwerse,	  M.	  M.,	  Dale,	  R.,	  Bard,	  E.	  G.,	  &	  Jeuniaux,	  P.	  (2012).	  Behavior	  matching	  in	  
multimodal	  communication	  is	  synchronized.	  Cognitive	  science,	  36(8),	  1404-­‐
1426.	  
Lund,	  K.,	  &	  Burgess,	  C.	  (1996).	  	  Producing	  high-­‐dimensional	  semantic	  spaces	  from	  
lexical	  co-­‐occurrence.	  	  Behavior	  Research	  Methods:	  Instruments	  and	  
Computers,	  28(2),	  203-­‐208.	  	  	  
MacDonald,	  M.,	  Pearlmutter,	  N.,	  &	  Seidenberg,	  M.	  (1994).	  	  The	  lexical	  nature	  of	  
syntactic	  ambiguity	  resolution.	  	  Psychological	  Review,	  101,	  676-­‐703.	  
Magnuson, J. S. (2005). Moving hand reveals dynamics of thought: Commentary on 
Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich (2005). Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 102, 9995-9996. 
Magnuson,	  J.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  Aslin,	  R.,	  &	  Dahan,	  D.	  (2003).	  	  The	  time	  course	  of	  
spoken	  word	  learning	  and	  recognition:	  Studies	  with	  artificial	  lexicons.	  	  
Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  General,	  132,	  202-­‐227.	  	  	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   48	  
Marian,	  V.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  (2003).	  	  Competing	  activation	  in	  bilingual	  language	  
processing:	  Within-­‐and	  between-­‐language	  competition.	  	  Bilingualism:	  
Language	  and	  Cognition,	  6,	  97-­‐115.	  	  	  	  	  
Marslen-­‐Wilson,	  W.	  (1975).	  	  Sentence	  perception	  as	  an	  interactive	  parallel	  process.	  	  
Science,	  189,	  226-­‐228.	  
Marslen-­‐Wilson,	  W.	  (1987).	  	  Functional	  parallelism	  in	  spoken	  word	  recognition.	  
Cognition,	  25,	  71-­‐102.	  
Marslen-­‐Wilson,	  W. & Zwitserlood, P. (1989). Accessing spoken words: The importance 
of word onsets. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 15, 576-585. 
McClelland,	  J.	  (1979).	  	  On	  the	  time	  relations	  of	  mental	  processes:	  An	  examination	  of	  
systems	  of	  processes	  in	  cascade.	  	  Psychological	  Review,	  86,	  287-­‐330.	  
McClelland,	  J.,	  &	  Elman,	  J.	  (1986).	  The	  TRACE	  model	  of	  speech	  perception.	  Cognitive	  
Psychology,	  18,	  1-­‐86.	  
McKinstry,	  C.,	  Dale,	  R.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2008).	  Action	  dynamics	  reveal	  parallel	  
competition	  in	  decision	  making.	  	  Psychological	  Science,	  19,	  22-­‐24.	  
McMurray,	  R.	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  (1999).	  The	  categorical	  perception	  of	  consonants:	  The	  
interaction	  of	  learning	  and	  processing.	  	  In	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Chicago	  
Linguistic	  Society	  Panels,	  35-­2,	  205-221. 
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   49	  
McMurray, B., Tanenhaus, M. K., & Aslin, R. N. (2002). Gradient effects of within-
category phonetic variation on lexical access. Cognition, 86, B33–42. 
McMurray,	  B.,	  Aslin,	  R.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  Spivey,	  M.,	  &	  Subik,	  D.	  (2008).	  Gradient	  
sensitivity	  to	  within-­‐category	  variation	  in	  words	  and	  syllables.	  	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  34,	  1609-­‐1631.	  
McRae,	  K.,	  Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  M.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  (1998).	  	  Modeling	  the	  effects	  of	  
thematic	  fit	  (and	  other	  constraints)	  in	  on-­‐line	  sentence	  comprehension.	  
Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  37,	  283-­‐312.	  
Meyer, A. S., Sleiderink, A. M., & Levelt, W. J. M. (1998). Viewing and naming objects. 
Cognition, 66, B25–B33. 
Miller,	  G.A.	  (1962).	  Some	  psychological	  studies	  of	  grammar.	  American	  Psychologist,	  
17,	  748-­‐762.	  
Møller,	  P.,	  &	  Hurlbert,	  A.	  (1997).	  	  Interactions	  between	  colour	  and	  motion	  in	  image	  
segmentation.	  	  Current	  Biology,	  7,	  105-­‐111.	  	  	  
Nadig,	  A.	  &	  Sedivy,	  J.	  (2002).	  Evidence	  of	  perspective-­‐taking	  constraints	  in	  children’s	  
on-­‐line	  reference	  resolution.	  Psychological	  Science,	  13,	  329-­‐336.	  
Neisser,	  U.	  (1976).	  Cognition	  and	  reality:	  Principles	  and	  implications	  of	  cognitive	  
psychology.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  W.H.	  Freeman.	  
Onnis,	  L.	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2012).	  Toward	  a	  new	  scientific	  visualization	  for	  the	  
language	  sciences.	  Information,	  3,	  1-­‐28.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   50	  
Pickering,	  M.,	  &	  Garrod,	  S.	  (2004).	  	  Toward	  a	  mechanistic	  psychology	  of	  dialogue.	  	  
Behavioral	  and	  Brain	  Sciences,	  27,	  169-­‐226.	  	  	  
Pisoni,	  D.,	  &	  Tash,	  J.	  (1974).	  Reaction	  times	  to	  comparisons	  within	  and	  across	  
phonetic	  categories.	  Perception	  and	  Psychophysics,	  15,	  285-­‐290.	  
Pykkönnen,	  P.	  &	  Crocker,	  M.	  (this	  volume).	  Attention	  in	  vision	  and	  language.	  
Rayner,	  K.,	  Carlson,	  M.,	  &	  Frazier,	  L.	  (1983).	  	  The	  interaction	  of	  syntax	  and	  semantics	  
during	  sentence	  processing:	  Eye	  movements	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  semantically	  
biased	  sentences.	  	  Journal	  of	  Verbal	  Learning	  and	  Verbal	  Behavior,	  22,	  358-­‐
374.	  
Richardson,	  D.C.,	  Dale,	  R.	  &	  Kirkham,	  N.Z.	  (2007)	  The	  art	  of	  conversation	  is	  
coordination:	  Common	  ground	  and	  the	  coupling	  of	  eye	  movements	  during	  
dialogue.	  Psychological	  Science,	  18	  (5),	  407-­‐413.	  
Richardson,	  D.C	  &	  Matlock,	  T.	  (2007).	  The	  integration	  of	  figurative	  language	  and	  
static	  depictions:	  An	  eye	  movement	  study	  of	  fictive	  motion.	  Cognition,	  102,	  
129-­‐138.	  
Shockley,	  K.,	  Richardson,	  D.	  C.	  &	  Dale,	  R.	  (2009)	  Conversation	  and	  coordinative	  
structures,	  Topics	  in	  Cognitive	  Science,	  1,	  305–319.	  
Shockley,	  K.,	  Santana,	  M.,	  &	  Fowler,	  C.	  (2003).	  	  Mutual	  interpersonal	  postural	  
constraints	  are	  involved	  in	  cooperative	  conversation.	  	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  29,	  326-­‐332.	  	  	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   51	  
Snedeker,	  J.	  &	  Trueswell.	  J.	  (2004).	  The	  developing	  constraints	  on	  parsing	  decisions:	  
The	  role	  of	  lexical-­‐biases	  and	  referential	  scenes	  in	  child	  and	  adult	  sentence	  
processing.	  	  Cognitive	  Psychology,	  49,	  238-­‐299.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2007).	  The	  continuity	  of	  mind.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.,	  Anderson,	  S.	  &	  Farmer,	  T.	  (2013).	  	  Putting	  syntax	  in	  context.	  	  In	  R.	  Van	  
Gompel	  (Ed.),	  Sentence	  Processing.	  (pp.115-­‐135).	  New	  York:	  Psychology	  
Press.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.,	  Dale,	  R.,	  Knoblich,	  G.,	  &	  Grosjean,	  M.	  (2010).	  Do	  curved	  reaching	  
movements	  emerge	  from	  competing	  perceptions?	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  Performance,	  36,	  251-­‐254.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Geng,	  J.	  (2001).	  Oculomotor	  mechanisms	  activated	  by	  imagery	  and	  
memory:	  Eye	  movements	  to	  absent	  objects.	  Psychological	  Research,	  65,	  235-­‐
241.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.,	  Grosjean,	  M.,	  &	  Knoblich,	  G.	  (2005).	  Continuous	  attraction	  toward	  
phonological	  competitors.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  
102,	  10393-­‐10398.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Marian,	  V.	  (1999).	  	  Cross	  talk	  between	  native	  and	  second	  languages:	  
Partial	  activation	  of	  an	  irrelevant	  lexicon.	  	  Psychological	  Science,	  10,	  281-­‐284.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  (1998).	  	  Syntactic	  ambiguity	  resolution	  in	  discourse:	  
Modeling	  the	  effects	  of	  referential	  context	  and	  lexical	  frequency.	  	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology:	  Learning,	  Memory,	  and	  Cognition,	  24,	  1521-­‐1543.	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   52	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  Eberhard,	  K.	  &	  Sedivy,	  J.	  (2002).	  	  Eye	  movements	  and	  
spoken	  language	  comprehension:	  Effects	  of	  visual	  context	  on	  syntactic	  
ambiguity	  resolution.	  	  Cognitive	  Psychology,	  45,	  447-­‐481.	  
Spivey,	  M.	  J.,	  Tyler,	  M.,	  Eberhard,	  K.,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.	  (2001).	  	  Linguistically	  
mediated	  visual	  search.	  Psychological	  Science,	  12,	  282-­‐286.	  
Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  M.	  J.	  (1996).	  Integration	  of	  visual	  and	  linguistic	  information:	  
Human	  data	  and	  model	  simulations.	  	  Ph.D.	  Dissertation,	  University	  of	  
Rochester.	  
Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Sedivy,	  J.	  (1995).	  	  Resolving	  attachment	  ambiguities	  with	  
multiple	  constraints.	  Cognition,	  55,	  227-­‐267.	  
Staub,	  A.	  (2011).	  Word	  recognition	  and	  syntactic	  attachment	  in	  reading:	  Evidence	  
for	  a	  staged	  architecture.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  General,	  140,	  
407-­‐433.	  
Swinney,	  D.A.	  (1979).	  Lexical	  access	  during	  sentence	  comprehension:	  
(Re)consideration	  of	  context	  effects.	  Journal	  of	  Verbal	  Learning	  and	  Verbal	  
Behavior,	  18,	  645-­‐659.	  
Tabor, W., & Hutchins, S. (2004). Evidence for self-organized sentence processing: 
Digging in effects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 30, 431–450. 
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   53	  
Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  &	  Trueswell,	  J.	  (1995).	  	  Sentence	  comprehension.	  	  In	  J.	  Miller,	  &	  P.	  
Eimas	  (Eds.),	  Handbook	  of	  Cognition	  and	  Perception.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Academic	  
Press.	  
Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  Leiman,	  J.M.,	  &	  Seidenberg,	  M.S.	  (1979).	  Evidence	  for	  multiple	  stages	  
in	  the	  processing	  of	  ambiguous	  words	  in	  syntactic	  contexts.	  Journal	  of	  Verbal	  
Learning	  and	  Verbal	  Behavior,	  18,	  427-­‐440.	  
Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  M.,	  Eberhard,	  K.	  &	  Sedivy,	  J.	  (1995).	  	  Integration	  of	  
visual	  and	  linguistic	  information	  during	  spoken	  language	  comprehension.	  	  
Science,	  268,	  1632-­‐1634.	  
Trueswell,	  J.,	  &	  Hayhoe,	  M.	  (1993).	  	  Surface	  segmentation	  mechanisms	  and	  motion	  
perception.	  	  Vision	  Research,	  33,	  313-­‐328.	  	  	  
Trueswell,	  J.C.	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  M.K.,	  (Eds.)	  (2005).	  Processing	  world-­situated	  language:	  
Bridging	  the	  language-­as-­action	  and	  language-­as-­product	  traditions.	  
Cambridge,	  Mass:	  MIT	  Press.	  
Trueswell,	  J.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  &	  Garnsey,	  S.	  (1994).	  Semantic	  influences	  on	  parsing:	  
Use	  of	  thematic	  role	  information	  in	  syntactic	  disambiguation.	  	  Journal	  of	  
Memory	  and	  Language,	  33,	  285-­‐318.	  
Trueswell,	  J.,	  Tanenhaus,	  M.,	  &	  Kello,	  C.	  (1993).	  	  Verb-­‐specific	  constraints	  in	  
sentence	  processing:	  Separating	  effects	  of	  lexical	  preference	  from	  garden-­‐
paths.	  	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  Learning,	  Memory,	  and	  Cognition,	  
19,	  528-­‐553.	  	  	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   54	  
van der Meulen, F., Meyer, A., & Levelt, W. (2001). Eye movements during the 
production of nouns and pronouns. Journal of Memory and Cognition, 29, 512–
521. 
van	  der	  Wel,	  R.	  P.	  R.	  D.,	  Eder,	  J.,	  Mitchel,	  A.,	  Walsh,	  M.,	  &	  Rosenbaum,	  D.	  (2009).	  
Trajectories	  emerging	  from	  discrete	  versus	  continuous	  processing	  models	  in	  
phonological	  competitor	  tasks:	  A	  commentary	  on	  Spivey,	  Grosjean,	  and	  
Knoblich	  (2005).	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  Human	  Perception	  and	  
Performance,	  35,	  588–594.	  
Van	  Gompel,	  R.	  P.	  G.	  &	  Järvikivi,	  J.	  (this	  volume).	  The	  role	  of	  syntax	  in	  sentence	  and	  
referential	  processing.	  
van	  Gompel,	  R.P.G.,	  Pickering,	  M.J.,	  Pearson,	  J.,	  	  &	  Liversedge,	  S.P.	  (2005).	  Evidence	  
against	  competition	  during	  syntactic	  ambiguity	  resolution.	  	  Journal	  of	  
Memory	  and	  Language,	  52,	  284-­‐307.	  
van	  Gompel,	  R.	  P.	  G.,	  Pickering,	  M.,	  &	  Traxler,	  M.	  (2001).	  	  Reanalysis	  in	  sentence	  
processing:	  Evidence	  against	  current	  constraint-­‐based	  and	  two-­‐stage	  models.	  	  
Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  45,	  225-­‐258.	  	  	  
Van	  Orden,	  G.C.,	  Holden,	  J.G.,	  &	  Turvey,	  M.T.	  (2003).	  Self-­‐organization	  and	  cognitive	  
performance.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  General,	  132,	  331-­‐350.	  
Weber,	  A.,	  &	  Cutler,	  A.	  (2004).	  Lexical	  competition	  in	  non-­‐	  native	  spoken-­‐word	  
recognition.	  Journal	  of	  Memory	  and	  Language,	  50,	  1–25.	  
Wojnowicz,	  M.,	  Ferguson,	  M.,	  Dale,	  R.,	  &	  Spivey,	  M.	  J.	  (2009).	  The	  self-­‐organization	  of	  
	   Spivey	  and	  Huette	   55	  
explicit	  attitudes.	  Psychological	  Science,	  20,	  1428-­‐1435.	  
Yee,	  E.,	  &	  Sedivy,	  J.	  (2001).	  Using	  eye	  movements	  to	  track	  the	  spread	  of	  semantic	  
activation	  during	  spoken	  word	  recognition.	  Paper	  presented	  to	  the	  13th	  
annual	  CUNY	  sentence	  processing	  conference,	  Philadelphia.	  
Yee,	  E.,	  &	  Sedivy,	  J.	  C.	  (2006).	  Eye	  movements	  to	  pictures	  reveal	  transient	  semantic	  
activation	  during	  spoken	  word	  recognition.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  
Psychology:	  Learning,	  Memory,	  and	  Cognition,	  32,	  1–14.	  
 
